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The Vietnam War
Memorial and the
Gulf War
Paul L. Atwood
This article discusses the debate over the "meaning" of the Vietnam War Memorial in
Washington, D.C., relating it to the revision of the "Vietnam syndrome" as it has been
played out in recent U.S. armed interventions overseas. Considerable political struggle
occurred during the design phase of the memorial over which values the monument
should enshrine. Since its construction the memorial has continued to be a focus for
controversy about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy and has functioned as a
magnetfor continuing historical and political attempts to sort out the "lessons" of the
second Indochina war. This debate has helped shape the manner in which both the
Reagan and Bush administrations have responded to foreign "crises. " The issue in the
Persian Gulf was substantially the same as in Indochina, and at least for the moment,
reactionary interpretations of the lessons of Vietnam are in the ascendant. Historical and
cultural revisionism contributed to public willingness to employ devastatingforce against
Grenada, Panama, and Iraq.
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the dedication of the Vietnam War
Memorial in Washington, D.C., the outcome of the Gulf War may serve to
underscore the debate over the "meaning" of this highly controversial symbol. It is
clear that the Wall, as Vietnam veterans call it, has occupied a very special, if not
central, symbolic space in the ongoing politicocultural attempt to make sense of the
war in Indochina and define it for history. The Vietnam memorial has become a piv-
otal cultural icon during the last decade, one which has been the subject of intense
scrutiny and struggle to delineate its importance in the ongoing debate over inter-
pretation of the war. 1 Most important, America's "Wailing Wall" has been emblem-
atic of the argument over the future direction of American foreign policy. President
George Bush's promise that the Gulf War would not be "another Vietnam" was a
conscious attempt to exploit the Gulf crisis to purge the national sense of shame and
impotence that has been seen as the negative legacy of Vietnam by proponents of
armed diplomacy.
Paul L. Atwood is a research associate in the William Joiner Centerfor the Study Of WarAnd Social
Consequences at the University ofMassachusetts at Boston.
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On one side of the debate are those who call into question the proclaimed role of
the United States as defender of the "free world" in the aftermath of World War II.
How was it possible, many ask, that the United States should virtually have destroyed
Vietnam in the name of saving it? And what does the unconscionable destruction,
chiefly on the territory of our ostensible ally, South Vietnam, say about the real aims
of American policy? Many American citizens see the Vietnam memorial as a neces-
sary reminder of the tragic end of imperial adventurism and a warning to future gen-
erations not to become trapped in a net of presidential lies and deceits. The nearly
59,000 names on the Wall bear mute testimony to the costs of armed policy.2
Others see the memorial as a "black gash of shame" that seems to celebrate
defeat and dishonor. During his presidency, Ronald Reagan sought to cast the Viet-
nam memorial as a testament to and symbol of a failed "noble cause" that became
tragic primarily because a "vocal minority" sabotaged the nation's will to win. 3 In
this view, the death of Americans without clear-cut victory has rendered their sacri-
fice all but void, leaving bile in the mouths of survivors. The "lesson" of Vietnam
then, which the memorial ought to teach, is that "good intentions" are a nullity in
the absence of victory.
Such logic gathered power in the face of the Reagan administration's use of force
in Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Later, President Bush built upon
the foundations laid by his predecessor to slam into tiny Panama, under the cover of
darkness and with high tech ablazing. The fact that the United Nations condemned
this violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Panama, as did the Organi-
zation of American States, was lost in the popular exultation following the lightning
success of Operation Just Cause. The "Vietnam syndrome" was being laid to rest.
The America of the 1950s was coming back. "By God! We've licked the Vietnam syn-
drome," gushed President Bush after the hundred-hour war in the Iraqi desert.
The Wall was controversial from the start, and the initial antagonisms to its design
were really deep cover for objections concerning the outcome of the war. Bothered
by the collective amnesia about Vietnam that overtook the United States after the
fall of Saigon in 1975, a group of Vietnam veterans headed by Jan Scruggs, Tom
Carhart, and James Webb initiated a campaign to build a memorial to the war dead
on the nearly sacral ground of the Washington Mall. Despite the best intentions of
the memorial committee they assembled, the old bitter controversies immediately
reemerged with passionate intensity. Pentagon officials sneered at the efforts of the
committee, composed initially entirely of Vietnam veterans, calling them crybabies
and vowing that no memorial would ever be built to "losers." The committee then
attempted to enlist bipartisan support on Capitol Hill in the persons of Senators
Barry Goldwater and George McGovern, but their efforts were impeded by an
avalanche of letters hostile to the latter who, in the minds of many writers, was the
man most responsible for the American "defeat." When the committee approached
the heads of large multinational corporations, many of which had profited hand-
somely during the war, they were accused of attempting to extort blood money. In
short, all the controversies that had promoted the collective amnesia threatened the
construction of the memorial. 4
The memorial committee insisted on an open, democratic design contest and
approved the selection of Maya Ying Lin, a Yale architecture undergraduate and a
Chinese-American. Ms. Lin, barely twenty years old, had few direct memories of the
war and described herself as apolitical. Yet her vision of stark black walls emerging
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from earth, which itself appears to be wounded, struck a chord in the design com-
mittee composed of distinguished architects. The emphasis of the design was on
healing and invited sober reflection about the costs of the war. It functioned in the
manner of an ancient Roman memento mori, a serious reminder that we all must
die and return to the earth. The inclined angles of the walls suggested human hands
opening to reach mourners in a healing embrace. Another grace of the design lay in
the mirror-smooth texture of the black granite. As anyone who has ever visited the
memorial knows, the effect of standing before the Wall and pondering the names, at
the same time seeing the reflection of one's own face and the sky overhead and
nearby trees, is a profoundly moving experience that aptly symbolizes the solemnity
of death while capturing a continuing commitment to the living.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, however, ideas about art and heroism were not what
they had been. The imperial renderings typical of other Washington war memorials
could not address the collective emotion of the nation about Vietnam— if such a
thing could be said to exist. Unlike the other monuments, which glorify heroism and
hence war, Maya Ying Lin's design was a superbly contemplative abstraction that
begged an utterly sane question: "Is war, any war, worth this price?"
H. Ross Perot, the millionaire Texas financier who had underwritten the cost of
the design contest, ran roughshod over the democratic procedures that had resulted
in approval of the Lin design and railed against the design committee, leading a con-
servative attack on the perceived symbolism of the design. James Webb, a secretary
of the navy during the Reagan administration— and a highly acclaimed author of a
successful popular novel on Vietnam— asked publicly, "Why is it black?" and "Why
is it underground?" Thomas Carhart, a former West Pointer and platoon leader in
Vietnam, whose own design had been rejected, said, "I just can't live with this. There
have been a lot of us who have been looking for a memorial to celebrate and glorify
the Vietnam veteran."
Before long, many veterans nationwide were referring to the design as a mark
of shame. 5
In September 1981, William F. Buckley's National Review lobbed a bombshell,
calling the design "Orwellian glop," and urged the Reagan administration "to throw
the switch on this project."
Okay, we lost the Vietnam War . . . Okay, the thing was mismanaged from start to
finish. But the American soldiers who died in Vietnam fought for their country
and deserve better than the outrage that has been approved as their memorial. 6
In a Washington Post article, Tom Wolfe called the memorial a "tribute to Jane
Fonda." Labeling the jurors in the design the "Mullahs of Modernism," in a blatant
attempt to tarnish the patriotism of the design jury in the wake of the Iranian
hostage crisis, Wolfe added:
By the late 1940's the universities were turning out students who acted as if mod-
ernism were encoded in their genes. You could put a gun at the temple of one of
the new breed and you couldn't make him sculpt a realistic figure of a soldier to
put up on a pedestal.7
Many opponents of the design objected to its color. The issue of the memorial's
blackness as symbolic of shame could not fail to offend many of the nation's black
veterans, who justly felt that they had borne a disproportionate share of the burden
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and grief of Vietnam. One of the nation's highest ranking black officers, General
George Price, was moved to say:
I remind all of you of Martin Luther King, who fought for justice for all Ameri-
cans. Black is not a color of shame. I am tired of hearing it called such by you.
Color meant nothing on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam. We are all equal
in combat. Color should mean nothing now. 8
Yet clearly, the color of Asians had meant something on the battlefields. Without
doubt, the race of Maya Ling Yin was a source of deep dissatisfaction to many who felt
that the design of the memorial was compromised by its Asian-American authorship.
Unfortunately, the official history of the memorial, To Heal a Nation, downplays this
ugly aspect of the choice of the winning design. Though many veterans felt that such a
choice was a fitting, though unintended, touch, which might help to effect reconcilia-
tion, many others conveyed contempt. Numerous veterans working to raise funds for
the memorial encountered expressions of outrage that a "dink" or a "slope" had been
allowed to design "our" memorial. Admiral Thomas Moore, a former chairman of the
Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam War, went so far as to say "I don't like the idea that it
was not designed by an American."9 Such attitudes demonstrated that the anti-Asian
variant of racism, which helped to foster the war, is still endemic to American society.
Responding to the reactionary backlash, Secretary of the Interior James Watt
refused his necessary signature unless the site could be redesigned to include a flag,
unusual for a war memorial, as well as a heroic statue dedicated to the valor of Viet-
nam veterans. Since Watt's intransigence otherwise spelled doom, a compromise had
to be effected by the committee. Over the strenuous objections of Maya Ying Lin, a
bronze of heroic stature, depicting three American fighting men— Caucasian, Afro-
American, and Latino— was added. This marked a turning point in the ideological
struggle to control the meaning of the Vietnam memorial. 10
For a brief hiatus during and shortly after the Vietnam conflict, warriors went out
of fashion. But with the advent of the so-called Reagan revolution, revisionist inter-
pretations of the Vietnam experience were catapulted to the forefront of cultural
productions, not least in those oriented to mass consumption. No longer the alien-
ated, disaffected symbol of failed policies, the Vietnam veteran in films like the
Rambo series, Missing in Action, Uncommon Valor, replayed and won the war in popu-
lar fantasy. The Clint Eastwood epic Heartbreak Ridge, in addition to functioning as a
two-hour Marine Corps recruiting vehicle, depicted the U.S. invasion of Grenada as
standard military heroics by young U.S. citizens against evil incarnate, also serving
ominous notice that there would be no more Vietnams— no defeats, that is. At
about the same time, a largely adolescent audience flocked to see Hamburger Hill, a
film about a notorious battle in which the United States suffered horrible casualties,
only to give up the territory a few days later. The film was a shameless attempt to ele-
vate infantry "gruntdom" to Valhallan epic: any sacrifice is worth the price as long as
the boys comport themselves heroically. The sales of war toys, virtually banished from
toy stores throughout the 1970s, since 1982 have risen by 700 percent. During the
same period the number of hours of "war cartoons" increased from 1.5 to 43 hours
per week in 1989. In the latter year, the average four- to eight-year-old would see 250
half-hour episodes of these cartoons and over a thousand thirty-second commercials
selling the paraphernalia accompanying this propaganda. 11 As one antiwar veterans
organization notes, this amounts to a videonic basic training for kids. 12 The tears shed
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at the Vietnam War Memorial are ceasing to be in sorrow over the tragic waste of
lives, both American and Indochinese. As the revisionists have their way, the Wall
will represent a symbol of determination never to "fail" again.
Many of the soldiers who served in the Gulf, particularly those in the front-line
outfits, were children when the sea change in mass media depictions of Vietnam,
and of militarism, was undertaken. The popular understanding of the Vietnam con-
flict had led to revulsion toward war in general and a virtual boycott of G.I. Joe toys
(best-sellers in the early years of the Vietnam War) and similar products. At the
most basic level, the public believed that the United States had been led into combat
as a result of presidential duplicity and congressional ineptitude and that a tragedy
had ensued for America's stature in the world. By 1984 this view, all but banished
from media outlets, was replaced by a manufactured consensus that an armed
American foreign policy was the requisite nostrum to address the decline of the
United States— as defined by the Reagan-Bush administration.
The essential shallowness of public understanding of the issues involved in Viet-
nam also ill prepared the American people to understand many important facets of
the Gulf crisis. The gnawing sense of self-doubt, exacerbated by almost ceaseless
media and presidential jeremiads about the need to expunge American impotence,
also contributed to the psychological imperative to see the United States "standing
tall" once again.
The parallels between the Vietnam conflict and the Gulf require some elaboration.
The success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and the defeat of the anointed
client, the Kuomintang, upset American development plans for post-World War II
Asia. Ironically, the very defeat of the Japanese by the United States paved the way
for the Chinese communists, especially since the forces of Chiang Kai-shek were
notoriously incompetent and corrupt. 13 A full-scale assault against the Vietnamese
Revolution became a necessary gambit for American policy after the Geneva
Accords of 1954 all but endorsed the victory of the Vietminh. The agreements at
Geneva, stipulating that Vietnam be partitioned temporarily until reunifying elec-
tions could be held under United Nations auspices in 1956, augured ill for U.S.
plans. For one thing, the election of Ho Chi Minh was a foregone conclusion, which
alone would have punctured the crucial element of American anticommunist ideol-
ogy that communists achieved power (in the pre-Gorbachev era) only by means of
the gun or by trickery. A reunited Vietnam, under a communist government man-
dated in an open, internationally monitored election, seemed to spell disaster for
American plans. The elections were therefore aborted, and a new nation, South
Vietnam, was "invented." 14
North Vietnam was never the creation of either Moscow or Beijing, but the
United States set up a quisling government south of the 17th parallel since, in the
absence of the Kuomintang, a new client was needed to spearhead attempts by U.S.
policymakers to salvage what was left of Southeast Asia for themselves. Ngo Dinh
Diem's refusal to participate in nationwide elections, and his efforts to undo the
genuine reforms of the Vietminh in the South Vietnamese countryside, led to the
creation of the National Liberation Front in 1960. Diem's attempts to conscript
peasants to fight against their own compatriots had little success, so an American
invasion of South Vietnam became necessary to secure the continued existence of
this client regime against the ostensible beneficiaries of the "democracy" the United
States had brought to southern Vietnam.
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President Lyndon Johnson appealed to Congress for endorsement of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution so that he might facilitate American military intervention, having
seen the United States' political and economic policies fail in Southeast Asia. As
congressional hearings and The Pentagon Papers showed, Johnson lied to the
Congress and the American people about the sequence of events in the Gulf of
Tonkin in order to induce them to believe that the North Vietnamese had intention-
ally committed an act of unprovoked aggression against the peaceful forces of the
United States. In fact, the United States had fostered a secret plan to initiate bomb-
ing of North Vietnam well prior to early August 1964; all that was needed to set it in
motion was a pretext. 15
There are significant parallels in the Gulf crisis. The most important is the con-
tinued dominance of the United States in the Middle East and the containment of
Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, just as the primary impetus for the
United States in 1954 had been to salvage preponderance in Southeast Asia and
contain China. While not exactly a client of the United States, Saddam Hussein nev-
ertheless benefited by playing a role against Iran that suited the overriding premise
of American policy. When he invaded Kuwait he stepped out of his assigned role
and threatened the fragile balance of forces in the Gulf region so carefully crafted in
the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.
An Iraq in control of both domestic and Kuwaiti oil, with expanded outlets to the
sea, would have become the de facto regional power, one which owed much of its
military machine to the Soviets (though also to West Germany, France, Britain, and
the United States), and one which clearly had tendencies toward an independent
policy of its own. That may have included renewed war with Iran. It may also have
meant brokered agreements with both Germany and Japan to deliver oil at prices
substantially lower than those which the U.S.-led consortiums in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait had been charging these two rapidly emerging economic superpowers. In the
wake of U.S. economic decline, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had been depositing their
immense sums of petrodollars in Japanese banks, thereby strengthening the
Japanese system. 16
In Southeast Asia the United States had lost its favored client, the Kuomintang,
which it had hoped would contain the communists both in China itself and in neigh-
boring Vietnam. Kuomintang troops had been employed north of the 16th parallel
in 1946 in order to partition Vietnam in the aftermath of the September Revolution
of 1945 and to allow British (and rearmed Japanese) troops to prepare the way for
the return of the French in the south. After the abject ejection of Chiang's forces
from mainland China by the communists in 1949, the long-cherished dream of the
"Great China Market" seemed at an end. In response, the United States sought to
reindustrialize Japan as the "workshop of Asia," and to anchor what remained of
the region to the Western economic system. To function as a linchpin in the new
global order envisioned at Bretton Woods, Japan would require sources of raw
materials in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, therefore, became symbolically critical as the
United States pinned its hopes on the French to retain Indochina in the Western
orbit. After the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, the United States sought to subvert the
1954 Geneva Accords and create a new client out of whole cloth.
The role played by the United Nations is important. As an arm of the UN, the
Geneva Conference stipulated that the world body accepted the territorial integrity
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of Vietnam. Partition between 1954 and 1956 was intended only as a temporary
measure to allow the return of peoples north and south. The elections of 1956 were
to be carefully monitored by India, Canada, and Poland, and the elected government
duly recognized. That would have left the United States bereft of clients in South-
east Asia at the time, a fact that explains the tenacity with which succeeding U.S.
administrations toughed it out until 1973. At least by then Thailand had been
groomed to replace South Vietnam. Communism in Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya
had been extirpated. By then, too, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos had been so devas-
tated that any claim to victory against the United States could only be called Pyrrhic.
The near apocalyptic condition of Indochina virtually ensured that eventually these
nations would come begging for normalization of relations with the United States,
even allowing draconian International Monetary Fund and World Bank methods to
direct their future development (as is the case in Laos).
The UN never ruled on the matter of the disputed Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, a failure
that eventuated in the crisis. Long before the UN came into existence, after the col-
lapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Britain had carved out putative
client states of its own to guard its hegemony in the Gulf region, having assented to
a French sphere of influence farther to the west, in Syria and Lebanon. The bound-
aries assigned to Iraq seemed arbitrary but were intended to keep the emirate of
Kuwait as a trading entrepot in Britain's control, guarding as it did the Persian Gulf.
Oil was not yet the prize. In fact, Britain had been encroaching upon Ottoman terri-
tories even prior to World War I in order to thwart German intentions in the region.
However, in the aftermath of the Great War, Britain decided that keeping all its
mandates and clients in a weakened state was simply good policy, so the former
Turkish province of Basra was not incorporated into Iraq. Some of it was, and the
rest was partitioned off as the British colony of Kuwait.
There had long been an emirate of Kuwait, dating back to the late eighteenth cen-
tury, but there had never been any assigned boundary to this tiny fiefdom, the size of
which expanded or shrank according to the size of the herds of livestock and the ter-
ritory they grazed. Numerous sheikdoms and emirates also existed on the territory
of what would become various Gulf states, yet few of these — and none in Iraq—
survived the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Kuwait served the important
purposes of providing Britain with undisputed naval authority in the Gulf while
weakening Iraq and Iran. When the immense reservoirs of oil in Mesopotamia, the
Arabian Peninsula, and Persia were discovered and put into production, this state of
affairs appeared as geopolitical prescience on the part of Britain. There was then no
chance that Iraq's claim to Kuwait would ever be taken seriously.
Just as World War I caused the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, so did World
War II signal the dismemberment of the British Empire. The United States played
Rome to Britain's Athens, and the hegemonic position formerly occupied by the
latter fell to the former. Increasingly, U.S. policy evolved to thwart the imperial
hangover of France and Britain and continue the geopolitical chess game of balanc-
ing power in the Mideast. The arrangement crafted by the former European great
powers seemed adequate, pitting as it did Arab against Arab, Arab against Persian,
Turk, and Kurd— and after 1947, Arab against Israeli. The boundaries established
by the British in the Gulf ensured virtually perpetual instability, since national fron-
tiers encompassed amalgams of widely differing peoples and faiths. Thus, the single
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overriding threat to U.S. influence, political unity among Arabs, was already effec-
tively subverted. The attempt by Saddam Hussein to achieve union between Iraq
and Kuwait, thereby giving Iraq control over the lion's share of Gulf oil, would have
severely disrupted American plans for the region, given Iraq much too much lever-
age over the international price of oil, and potentially given Iraq too much real mili-
tary prowess as a regional power. Potentially, too, success at this unification, under
the noses of the West, would have spurred renewed Pan-Arab nationalism, the very
outcome U.S. policy had always been at pains to obviate.
Put succinctly, Saddam's success at achieving integration between his nation and
Kuwait would have posed a deadly threat to American development plans, just as the
victory of the Chinese communists and political unification of Southern and Northern
Vietnam appeared to have done to plans for Southeast Asia between 1949 and 1954.
The Persian Gulf Resolution, passed overwhelmingly by Congress in votes almost
as lopsided as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, was sold to the American public as the
moral equivalent of a Red Cross mission to liberate Kuwaitis from oppressive rule.
An identical pitch, with respect to the "salvation" of South Vietnam, was made in
1964 to support, first, the bombing of North Vietnam and later the injection of
American combat troops into South Vietnam. Missing in 1964, at least for public
consumption, was information that would have negated the charge that the North
Vietnamese had perpetrated the ethical equal of Pearl Harbor, since the destroyers
Maddox and Turner Joy had been assisting South Vietnamese naval forces to harass
North Vietnamese ports. Missing, too, was information on the secret plan to bomb
North Vietnam, which had been on the shelf for some time. Most important, the
American public was fed the myth that the "independent nation" of South Vietnam
was the victim of the illegal aggression of its neighbor. All but forgotten at the time
was that in 1955 the United States had subverted the mechanisms of the nascent
United Nations to bring peace to Indochina.
The United States also had a secret plan to inject a rapid deployment force into
the Middle East. 17 When investigators uncovered the plan, top Pentagon officials ini-
tially said that the operations were geared to forestall a potential Soviet move into
the Gulf region. However, the Soviets had acknowledged an American sphere of
influence there dating back to the "crisis" over Iran in 1946, when the Soviets were
induced to withdraw from northern Iranian territories in exchange for a pledge of
a share of Iranian oil. Having begun the process of dispossessing the British, the
Americans were not inclined to grant Soviet concessions, so the Iranian parliament,
the Majlis, repudiated the deal with the Soviets. The United States pleaded igno-
rance and the Soviet withdrawal stood. The USSR has never contemplated a mili-
tary challenge to U.S. hegemony in the region for the same reason that it has never
moved westward beyond the pale of the Iron Curtain— the virtual certainty of ther-
monuclear war.
The real threat came from the direction of Pan-Arabian nationalism, potentially
leading to unification of Arab states, or from Islamic fundamentalists extremely hos-
tile to satraps like the shah of Iran, or the royal houses of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
and the pollution of their ancient traditions by Western influences. It was for this
reason that rapid deployment became a fixture of American foreign policy, not
because of any presumed Soviet threat. Yet that rationale had served as cover for
the development of such military capabilities as were demonstrated in Operation
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Desert Storm. That American citizens had ever believed the Soviets were willing to
risk nuclear war over the Mideast, that Soviet troops, for example, were actually
bent on moving from Afghanistan, after their invasion of the country in 1979, to the
Gulf, is testament to the ability of the media to "invent reality" for the body politic. IH
The transubstantiation of the ethos of revulsion toward war, which characterized
the immediate post-Vietnam era, has been abetted by the mass media. This was
characteristic. Even during the later years of the Vietnam War, when public opinion
had clearly shifted against it, the press and electronic media had largely followed the
Nixon administration's line, even after the Pentagon Papers had been broken by the
New York Times. 19 The unwillingness of media outlets to challenge the Reagan-Bush
interpretation of foreign affairs resulted in the Iran-contra debacle, 20 accompanied
by a profound unwillingness on the part of any elite institutions, including Congress
and the press, to plumb the depths of, and expose, what amounted to a coup over
the Constitution. Despite enough information about a possible deal arranged by the
Reagan campaign in 1980 with the Ayatollah Khomeini not to release Iranian-held
American hostages until after the November elections, a possibility made more pal-
pable by revelations in Congress that Reagan did, indeed, provide arms to Iran as
early as 1981, the Dukakis campaign of 1988 broached not a word about the matter.
Numerous American citizens exclaimed that Reagan was justified in whatever he did
simply because they believed that he had restored the economy to health and made
America "walk tall" again. Contragate has thus emerged as the most extensive
whitewash in American history.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, with very few exceptions in estab-
lishment media, no serious scrutiny was given to the virtually unspoken reasons why
the United States went to war with Iraq.
In 1958, when the Baathist Party of Iraq overthrew the British-installed satrap,
King Faisal, the United States declared that any attempt by Iraq to annex Kuwait
would result in immediate American military intervention, despite the fact that
Kuwait was still a British possession. Earlier, in 1956, the United States had inter-
vened politically to call off a combined Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt to
forestall an eruption of Pan-Arab nationalism. Efforts by the former European
imperialists to recapture control— or perhaps their delusions of grandeur— threat-
ened future American plans. As early as 1945, the United States had given warning
that any threat to American access to the "greatest of all material prizes," that is, the
immense Gulf oil reservoirs, would constitute a casus belli. 21
So rationales such as concern for the fate of the Kuwaiti people, or the stance for
the principle of nonaggression, were disingenuous at best. No such scruples came
into play when Turkey invaded Cyprus, when Indonesia invaded the former Por-
tuguese Timor, when South Africa refused to withdraw from Namibia, when China
raped Tibet. Or more salient, when Iraq invaded Iran. In the latter case there was no
chance that either side could effect total victory. Rather, the attraction on the part of
the United States to supply both belligerents concerned the outcome that both would
be severely weakened, as well as the matter of cash generated by arms sales to Iran
for use in supplying the contras. The simultaneous engagement of Saddam Hussein
as a cryptoclient appeared to make it unlikely that he would step outside his assigned
role to challenge the United States. It would seem, too, that Saddam miscalculated in
his assessment of the situation. He knew that the UN knew of the long-standing dis-
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pute between Iraq and Kuwait over borders. He knew that the world knew and, more
emphatically, the Arab world knew, that Kirwaiti intransigence on the matter of rais-
ing oil prices redounded to the extreme detriment of Iraq and its effort to clear its
debt after the war with Iran. Finally, all players knew of Iraqi grievances over Kuwaiti
slant drilling in the disputed Rumailah oilfield. When the State Department refused
categorically to condemn Iraqi aggressive moves toward Kuwait in late July 1990,
Saddam reasoned that he could get away with the annexation.
Whether or not the United States led Iraq into a trap can be debated. Clearly, the
Iraqi invasion presented an opportunity to mobilize the rapid deployment of U.S.
forces in a grand way. which could be seen to stand against the forces of illegal
aggression in the outlawT world and be taken as a generous move by a strong power
to liberate a captive people from a savage bully. At the same time the "principle of
nonaggression" enshrined in the charter of the UN could be upheld.
The proclaimed purpose of the UN— to make war unnecessary and virtually
impossible — was subverted in Southeast Asia in 1955-1956, and the same was done
in the Southwest in 1990-1991. The members of the Security Council were brow-
beaten, cajoled, bribed, and threatened until all but two voted for the resolution
that would enable the United States to undertake the most intensive bombing cam-
paign in history— worse over the duration even than in Vietnam— in the name of
waging peace. Sanctions that would have left the civilians of Iraq with enough food,
medicine, and other basics to sustain the essentials of life, while progressively erod-
ing Iraq's warmaking capacity (and not. incidentally, its ability to conduct the sort of
terror operations launched against its own civilians), were bypassed in favor of use
of the greatest army ever assembled by the only global institute ostensibly devoted
to peace. War. with its attendant miseries — refugees, untreatable wounded, infant
deaths due to exposure and dehydration, the almost total destruction of civilian
infrastructure, and so forth— was the object of choice by a UN in thrall to an
America with a chip on its shoulder and a grudge to bear.
All predictable, just as the outcome in Indochina was prophesied. Much ink has
been expended about the "defeat" of the United States in Southeast Asia. But things
do not look so today. Once the "rice bowl of Asia," Vietnam cannot now feed itself.
The effects of Agent Orange have resulted in a population afflicted with the highest
rates of birth defects in the world. Though promised assistance to rebuild by Presi-
dent Nixon. Vietnam has received instead war by other means in the form of an
extensive embargo that, coupled with fiscal amateurism on the part of erstwhile revo-
lutionaries, has resulted in the near collapse of the Vietnamese economy. In neigh-
boring Cambodia, the American bombing campaign of the late 1960s and early 1970s
plowed the killing fields from which the Khmer Rouge reaped their grisly harvest.
Though Saddam Hussein has been weakened vis-a-vis his immediate neighbors, he
remains a source of terror to the Shiite population of southern Iraq and the Kurds of
the north. Kuwait is a monumental ecological catastrophe. Having waged war in the
name of liberating Kuwait, the United States has nevertheless come down on the side
of the continued rule of Saddam in Iraq— or at least of the Baathist Party by which
he rules. Having repeatedly said that Saddam had victimized his own population,
George Bush victimized them twice when he unleashed Desert Storm to expunge
their infrastructure and reduce Iraq, in the words of the UN, to a "near apocalyptic"
state. Now Saddam victimizes Iraqis thrice. All this in the name of freedom.
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Freedom for whom? Not for the Saudis who want an end to feudal rule. Not for
Kuwaitis who daily witness the priorities of their emir to restore his own splendor
while those who bore the full burden of Iraq's occupation languish without adequate
shelter and water. Not for the Shiites and Kurds of Iraq who were led to believe that
their deliverance was at hand.
Saddam and his minions have been delivered freedom carte blanche to renew
their tyranny. Hafez al Assad of Syria, a bloodstained despot and the moral equal of
Saddam, has been free virtually to annex Lebanon (the part not already under the
control of Israel) at the very moment U.S. citizens thought that their troops were
liberating Kuwait. The bribe of $3 billion paid to Assad as quid pro quo for his ser-
vices to the "alliance" against Iraq is already being spent for Chinese Silkworm mis-
siles possessing much greater accuracy than Scuds. 22 Both Saudi Arabia and Israel
will receive new top-of-the-line high-tech weapons. The military operation that was
supposed to bring peace and stability to the Gulf and the Mideast has prepared the
way for an even bloodier future round.
But the United States has secured freedom too — freedom for the major Ameri-
can oil companies in partnership with Aramco to further control petroleum produc-
ers in the Gulf and competitive consumers like Germany and Japan, and freedom
for the Bechtel Corporation to rebuild ruined Kuwait. It has long been an article of
faith that OPEC was dominated by the Gulf states, which conspired to raise prices
at the expense of American and other consumers. In fact, the United States has
always been a hidden member of OPEC, and the major oil companies were never
sorry to see the price of oil go up. As world prices stabilized over the last five years,
overseas operations became more important since Third World wages can be paid
there. The major block to renewed domestic production in the United States is not
that the price of oil is not high enough but that the cost of American labor is highly
injurious to the rate of profit. (This is also one reason why American construction
companies engaged in rebuilding Kuwait will not hire American workers for the
job.) Now the United States has co-opted the Saudi royal family even more closely.
The emir of Kuwait, too, owes a great debt to his benefactor. Both provincial gov-
ernors will abet U.S. pricing policies and both will begin to withdraw petrodollars
from Japanese banks for deposit in troubled U.S. banks and for the benefit of their
investment strategies.
Once again in the driver's seat, the United States will control the price of oil
available to Germany and the European Community (EC) in general. The policy of
the last forty years toward Japan to control its sources of energy is buttressed, and
Nippon's banking system has been simultaneously diminished. Faced with severe
challenges to its post-World War II policies of global domination, the United States
has moved to create a "new world order" by again seeking to reduce its rivals to
mere subsidiaries. From the view at the top the prospects look good.
But matters are never that simple. Neither the EC nor Japan will simply roll
over. Perhaps more important, the Soviet Union seems unlikely to become a mere
client. Though clearly a profound change has occurred over the last few years in
relations between the superpowers, the bombing of Baghdad, a capital virtually on
Soviet borders, could not have taken place without Soviet complicity, and the future
remains highly problematic.
Optimists believe that the recent coup failure against Mikhail Gorbachev repre-
sents the eventual triumph of democracy in the USSR. However, despite lack of
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careful planning by the plotters, the coup represents a deeply rooted and profound
animus against both Gorbachev's and Boris Yeltsin's reform program by hard-line
conservatives and others who view a return to authoritarian rule as the only solution
to worsening economic and political conditions. Let us remember that a majority of
the Russian population remained indifferent throughout the coup attempt.
The Soviet economy is on the verge of collapse. Soviet policy of the last fifty years
to keep Germany weak has come to failure, and Americans are seen as more than
partially to blame by right-wing organizations like Pamyat. While NATO troop
strength has abated somewhat, Western missiles are still poised at the heart of the
USSR. In addition, a new massively armed American naval presence remains on the
Soviet southern flank, and while President Bush insists that most of it will be with-
drawn, that remains to be seen.
The collapse of the Soviet center could lead to a recapitulation of strikingly simi-
lar conditions to those which occasioned the rise of totalitarianism and paranoia in
the first place. The United States will probably have little to say about a return to
authoritarian rule as long as the Soviet leaders are playing footsie with Washington.
However, many great Russian nationalists, especially, see Gorbachev and Yeltsin as
sellouts to the West. The events of August 19, 1991, may yet prove to have been a
dress rehearsal. We can be sure that future putschists will be much more aggressive
and ruthless.
A sharpening of militaristic competition between the superpowers would portend
worse than catastrophe, yet many Americans seem to bask in the supposed glories of
desert victory.
And that returns us to our initial theme.
Returning Vietnam veterans brought more than tales of hardship in jungle war-
fare. Many carried messages about large-scale atrocities committed in the name
of saving Vietnam. Many avowed that the high command had lost control of the
troops, many of whom refused any longer to endanger themselves or to participate
in the slaughter. Public confessionals such as the Citizens Committee of Inquiry in
1970 and the testimony of returning Vietnam soldiers during the Winter Soldier
Investigations of 1971 served to awaken U.S. citizens to the magnitude of the war
waged against civilians. The defection of groups like Vietnam Veterans Against
the War signaled that the war could no longer be prosecuted, and widespread
revulsion to it forced troop withdrawals from Southeast Asia. Many veterans were
shattered by what they had seen and done. Still the popular image of the Vietnam
veteran quickly came to focus not on the causes of his (and her) estrangement, but
on the symptoms of drug abuse and violent and antisocial behavior. By refusing to
deal with the etiology of posttraumatic stress disorders— that is, the war itself and
the genesis of American intervention — the mass media effectively silenced the
Vietnam veterans and transmogrified them into objects of fear or ridicule. Thus
was the process initiated by which the lessons of Vietnam were buried.
As the living survivors of Vietnam were co-opted, so were the dead. The initia-
tors of the Vietnam memorial project hoped for an altar of "healing and reconcili-
ation." Most understood this to mean a domestic process whereby the political
wounds in the polity would be bound up. However, as experience has since shown,
healing for many veterans has come with a return to Vietnam. Reconciliation also
means the capacity to see the former enemy as fully human and in need of com-
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passion and renewal. These are not the values of a militaristic and imperial soci-
ety. Such "feminine" virtues undermine the capacity to define armed power as the
signature of the nation.
The ideological struggle at the Wall intensified as the Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations fostered the renewed use of force. Those who remonstrated that the
original design cast aspersions on the honor of the nation, and on veterans, were
enabled to alter the memorial. The standard-cast heroic statues added to the site
injured its starkness. The Vietnam memorial was thereby invested with the mes-
sage of neighboring imperial allegorical figures in alabaster and bronze: "War is
the lifeblood of nations!" The somber memento mori, intended to encourage
sober reflection on the war and its outcomes, was vitiated.
Though the memorial had been officially dedicated on Veterans Day 1982,
another public display, Salute 2, was organized in 1984. At this second liturgy, Presi-
dent Reagan "officially accepted" the memorial on behalf of the nation only after
Frederick Hart's representational sculptures were added and blessed. Media cover-
age of the event stressed the theme "America's veterans— one and all" in a delib-
erate attempt to integrate younger Vietnam veterans with older veterans of the
"successful" wars. This transgenerational tactic would subsequently be seen in film
and television representations of the Vietnam "experience" as substantially identical
with World War II and Korea. 23 The Vietnam War was "decontextualized" by remov-
ing it— and the reality of the Vietnam veterans' experiences— from specific histor-
ical circumstances.
In his "dedication" speech, President Reagan said of Vietnam veterans that there
had been "a rethinking . . . Now we can say to you, and say as a nation, thank you for
your courage . . . It's time we moved on, in unity and with resolve, with the resolve to
always stand for freedom, as those who fought did, and always to try to protect and
preserve the peace."24
The Vietnam War had been "normalized" — made consistent with American
ideology. The deaths had been made rational, the veterans made whole and finally
unburdened of responsibility for "losing" the war. A consensus was manufactured
which elided those lessons of Vietnam not in sync with the new look in U.S. for-
eign policy.
Reagan was to get one more crack at revising the meaning of Vietnam. Shortly
after the 1988 elections, another media event was staged at the Wall. John Wheeler,
chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund and a speaker at the event,
declared, "Perhaps at this late date we can all agree that we've learned one lesson:
that young Americans must never again be sent to fight and die unless we are pre-
pared to let them win."25
Then senator-elect Charles Robb, son-in-law of Lyndon Johnson and a former
marine infantry commander in Vietnam, linked the reintegration of veterans to for-
eign policy.
Perhaps in no other area is the need so acute as in the area of foreign policy. We
have to proceed on a bipartisan basis for a course of energetic engagement, a
policy that vigorously asserts America's ideals and defends her interests abroad, a
policy that establishes our role as an inspiration to oppressed peoples everywhere
. . . And it must be a policy that neither renounces nor relies exclusively on the
use offeree, a policy tempered but not paralyzed by the lessons of Vietnam. 26
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Finally, in a photo opportunity used on the front pages of virtually every major
daily, President and Mrs. Reagan visited the Wall as mourners. Said Reagan, "Who
can doubt that the cause for which our men fought was just?27
Slightly more than one year later, Operation Just Cause was launched against
Panama, resulting in heavy civilian casualties (the extent of which the Bush adminis-
tration lied about), and roundly condemned by the UN as violating the territorial
sovereignty of the tiny nation. From the jingoist glee surrounding that turkey shoot,
it was but a small step to Baghdad and the killing fields of Iraq. %*>
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